1. Background, theory and research design

1.1 Introduction

The United States of America is often the first that comes to mind when thinking about immigration. With over 38 million foreign-born inhabitants in 2005, the United States have the largest immigrant population in the world. However, in relative terms several European countries have similar or larger immigrant communities. In 2005, the share of immigrants for the total population of both Germany and the United States was 13 per cent. In that same year immigrants made up eight per cent of the French, 11 per cent of the Dutch, 14 per cent of the Austrian populations respectively and as much as 24 per cent of the Swiss population.

Recent waves of immigrants tend to come from different and more distant countries than previously. The growing diversity caused by immigration is watched with unease by the native population. Many people feel that recent immigrants are reluctant to integrate and instead attempt to enforce their culture on the host country. There is a fear that immigrants will change the host country instead of being changed by it. The experience with guest-worker migrants in particular has shown that integration is not self-evident or at least that it does not proceed as fast as governments and host societies would like. In many European countries immigrants and their descendents are in a disadvantaged socio-economic position (see e.g. Michalowski 2007; Koopmans 2003). It is however the socio-cultural integration of immigrants that takes centre stage in recent integration debates.

Though socio-cultural aspects of integration such as language proficiency, interethnic contacts and identification have in the past also played a role in integration debates, they were never as prominent as they are today. Two important functions are attributed to socio-cultural integration. Firstly, socio-cultural integration can have a positive effect on socio-economic integration. Immigrants who are more proficient in the host country language are more likely to be employed (van Tubergen et al. 2004; Odé and Veenman 2003). Through social contacts with host country ethnics, immigrants can obtain valuable information about the labour market and the educational system and develop soft skills which in turn can lead to more success in these areas. Secondly, socio-cultural integration of immigrants and their descendents is judged to have a positive effect on society as a whole. Low proficiency in the host country language limits the possibilities for interaction with the majority population which in turn can threaten social cohesion. A low level of identification with the host society is also seen as problematic, not only for reasons of social cohesion but also as a potential source of political and religious radicalism. In the United Kingdom the debates that followed the ethnic riots of the summer of 2001 stressed

1 All data on immigrant stock are taking from SOPEMI 2008 (OECD), except from the German data that are based on Mikrozensus 2005.
Comparing integration

the importance of immigrants’ sense of belonging to their host country and the role of a shared language for social cohesion (Peucker 2009; Hussain and Bagguley 2005).

A number of countries have implemented policies that aim to stimulate socio-cultural integration. Over the past decade so-called “civic integration” programmes have been introduced. In 1998, the Netherlands were the first to implement a law mandating newly arrived immigrants to take a civic integration course. The course consisted of Dutch language instruction and civic education on Dutch bureaucracy and customs. Soon other countries followed the Dutch example (see, Costa-Lascoux 2006; Joppke 2007a). As Michalowski observes, civic integration programmes were initially set up to increase the human capital of immigrants and therewith minimise their chances of becoming socio-economically disadvantaged and a burden for the welfare state (Michalowski 2007). Civic integration courses however, also fit well with the growing desire to stimulate the socio-cultural integration of immigrants and their descendants. To a varying degree civic integration courses do not only aim to increase language proficiency and knowledge of societal and political institutions, but, also awareness of and compliance with cultural norms and values.

After a period of liberalisation several countries are also reemphasising cultural requirements for naturalisation (de Hart and van Oers 2006). In response to the ethnic riots in 2001, the United Kingdom introduced a mandatory citizenship oath and compulsory formalised citizenship tests (Peucker 2009). In 2003 the Netherlands replaced the informal citizenship assessment with very limited language and integration requirements by a formal exam that tests oral and written language proficiency and also has a significant cultural component. Applicants for Dutch citizenship are tested on their knowledge on the prevailing Dutch attitude towards issues such as gay people, education for women and knowledge of social customs.

The Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) of the British Council and Migration Policy Group that measures integration policies and compares them to “best practices”, views these policy developments as unfavourable for immigrant inclusion (Geddes and Niessen 2005). According to the MIPEX, policies that grant immigrants fast access to rights with no other conditions than the absence of a serious criminal conviction are most favourable to immigrant inclusion. Integration requirements are seen as hindering inclusion. Interestingly, what kind of policies qualify as “best practice” is not determined on the basis of information about the impact of policies on immigrant integration, but on a normative framework. Debates on the benefits of multiculturalism have likewise mainly remained on a theoretical level. Political philosophers such as Will Kymlicka and Bikhu Parekh have argued that immigrant integration is best served by a multicultural policy, i.e. a

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2 ‘The measures are about creating favourable policy conditions for immigrant inclusion – they do not describe immigrants' actual position in society or policy effectiveness. That would require a different type of indicator. The indicators do not establish whether or not inclusion has been successful, but whether or not favourable conditions in policy and law have been created’ (Geddes and Niessen 2005: 14-15).
policy that accommodates diversity (Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002). For example, adjusting the clothing rules of the police force so that Sikh or Muslim police officers can wear religious headgear can increase the sense of belonging and stimulate participation in the host society (Kymlicka 1998). In political debates, on the contrary, accommodation of diversity has become one of the main scapegoats for failing socio-cultural integration.

Little empirical knowledge exists on the effects of integration policies on actual socio-cultural integration of immigrants. This dissertation seeks to contribute to the scientific and political debate by examining the relationship between integration policies and socio-cultural integration. The best way to address this question is from a spatial and/or temporal comparative angle. By comparing the level of socio-cultural integration of immigrants in different policy contexts, more can be learned about the effects of these policies. Numerous studies have shown that countries have historically pursued different types of integration policy models, namely France, Germany and the Netherlands (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Koopmans et al. 2005; Banting et al. 2006). The focus of this study lies on three countries that are generally regarded as exponents of different integration policy models, namely France, Germany and the Netherlands (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Koopmans et al. 2005; Banting et al. 2006). As will be shown below, the policies in these three countries respectively approach what Koopmans et al. (2005) have termed a universalist, assimilationist, and multicultural conception of citizenship.

Though there are many studies that compare integration policies across countries and many studies on immigrant integration, few studies have investigated the link between the two. There are some cross-national studies on the relation between policies and political integration (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Bloemraad 2006; Kastoryano 2002a) and socio-economic integration (Dagevos et al. 2006; Tucci 2008; van Tubergen 2004; Doomernik 1998; Muus 2003), but comparative studies on the relation between integration policies and socio-cultural integration are rare (exceptions are Berry et al. 2006; Tucci 2008). Linking integration policies and immigrant integration is a complicated endeavour. Firstly because policies show internal inconsistencies and change over time, discourse and actual policies are not always aligned, and local differences can occur within countries (Maussen 2009). Secondly even if a more or less stable policy core can be identified, it is not said that this is the only or even the most important factor determining immigrant integration. There are several other factors on the individual, origin country and destination country level that can influence socio-cultural integration (see e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001; van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005). To be able to rule out some of the other factors, in particular at the origin country level, I use a quasi-experimental design that focuses on the same well-demarcated population in all three countries, namely guest-workers from central Turkey who migrated before 1975 and their descendants.

The first step in establishing a link between integration policies and socio-cultural integration of immigrants is to determine whether levels of integration vary between countries. The second step is to see to what extent this variation can be attributed to
integration policies. This dissertation is therefore guided by the following research questions:

1. To what extent are there differences in the degree of socio-cultural integration of Turkish immigrants and their descendents in France, Germany and the Netherlands?
2. To what extent can cross-national differences in socio-cultural integration be related to differences in integration policies?

This study does not aim for a mono-causal explanation of socio-cultural integration. Variables related to the region and country of origin, which are controlled for by way of the quasi-experimental design, as well as individual level factors such as education, migration generation and labour market position which are controlled for in the statistical analyses have a substantial impact on socio-cultural integration. However, as I will show, significant cross-national differences remain after controlling for these factors and these differences can be plausibly related to the different types of policies that these three countries have pursued. Thereby, this study throws new light on ongoing scientific and policy debates on how to promote socio-cultural integration.

1.2 Integration policies and conceptions of citizenship
A number of studies have provided rich historical accounts of the development of integration policies in a number of European countries (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999b; Favell 2001). These show that integration policies are rooted in a historically grown policy habitus that differs across nations. Several typologies have been developed to describe the differences between national models of integration policies (e.g. Castles 1995; Soysal 1994; Berry 2001; Entzinger 2000). One of the most-cited is the study by Brubaker (1992) on citizenship policies in France and Germany, which argues that the different nation building histories of France and Germany have led to distinctive conceptions of citizenship. France developed an inclusive civic conception and Germany and exclusive ethnic one. Burbaker further argues that these conceptions of citizenship form the basis of their citizenship policies. In France access to citizenship has been relatively open, in particular for the second generation. In Germany citizenship access was for a long time restricted for people who were not of German ancestry.

Next to the degree of openness of citizenship to immigrants, another often used dimension to distinguish integration policy models is the degree of accommodation or acceptance of minority group cultures (Castles 1995; Banting et al. 2006; Bourhis et al. 1997). This dimension differentiates countries such as France that strive for a unitary public sphere from those such as Sweden that accommodate or even actively stimulate immigrants’ retention of their culture and language of origin.

Both the existence and relevance of models of integration policies have come under increasing criticism. Two main streams of criticism can be discerned. The first argues
that the nation-state is not the appropriate unit of analysis. The nation-state as a methodological unit is challenged both from above by post- and transnationalists who claim that international treaties and transnational community life have a larger impact on the experiences of immigrants than national conceptions of citizenship (Soysal 1994; Bauböck 1994; Sassen 1998), and from below by those who argue that there are important local differences within countries (Favell 2001; Maussen 2009; Ireland 2004; Ellis and Almgren 2009). A second line of critique argues that it is not possible to speak of one national model because policies change over time and are not always coherent (Freeman 2004; Weil 2001; Duyvendak and Scholten 2009). Based on an investigation of civic integration courses in France, Germany and the Netherlands, Joppke uses a similar argument, concluding that ‘the notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did’ (2007a: 2). Freeman states no country has a ‘truly coherent’ integration regime (2004: 946). He argues that typologies of integration policy regimes are not useful because integration is ‘a product of intersections of migrants’ aspirations and strategies with regulatory frameworks in four domains – state, market, welfare and culture. Because some but not all of the regulatory institutions in these domains were created with immigrant incorporation in mind, national incorporation frameworks are not fully cohesive, are constantly changing, and at best can be described as belonging to a handful of loosely connected syndromes’ (2004: 945).

Nevertheless models remain a popular research instrument. Bader argues that changes over time and differences between policies domains notwithstanding, there is still a ‘minimal internal coherence’ of policies within a country and that models are a useful tool to prevent ‘drowning in unstructured complexity’ (Bader 2007: 879). Other authors have also argued that changes in policies do not mean it is impossible to identify a model. Favell argues that despite competing views there is a consensus within countries of the basic terms for identifying ‘the objects and issues of public policy’ (2001: 9). He describes a ‘national idea of citizenship’ as a ‘floating and vaguely defined concept: rooted in some sense but open to varied interpretation and use, while nevertheless containing a certain bundle of connected concepts and connotations’ (2001: 24). Maussen takes a stand against oversimplified and static models that ignore internal pluralism, the role of policy fields other than integration, and changes over time. Nevertheless he argues that policies continue to be influenced by ‘country specific regimes of government’ (2009: 245). Policies are based on a pick and mix from the different traditions that countries possess. For instance, to understand the governance of Islam in France not only laïcité but also the Gallican and Concordatarian systems of state cooptation of religion have to be taken into account. In the Netherlands not only the history of pillarisation but also debates between secular-liberalists and pluralists have left their mark (Maussen 2009; see Joppke 2000 for a similar argument).

Koopmans et al. have developed a typology that incorporates much of the critique on previous models of integration policies (2005; see also, Koopmans and Statham 2000). Their typology of ‘conceptions of citizenship’, i.e. ‘the ideas about the rights, duties, and identities linking citizens to the nation-state’ (2005:7), is built on the two above mentioned
Comparing integration. The first dimension runs from ethnic to civic. It entails the extent to which immigrants are seen as members of the nation and receive the same individual rights as the host population. The second dimension, monism-pluralism, captures the possibilities for differential rights based on belonging to a certain cultural or religious group. Combined, these two dimensions create four ideal-types that are presented in figure 1.1. Universalism unites an open civic conception of citizenship with a monist conception that leaves little room for the accommodation of diversity. Multiculturalism also represents a civic conception of citizenship but combined a pluralistic conception. Assimilationism is characterised by a closed, ethnic conception and little accommodation of diversity. Lastly, segregationism grants immigrants few rights, but does not require them to give up their culture or even accommodates immigrants’ cultures.

Figure 1.1 Conceptions of Citizenship. Source: Koopmans et al. (2005), p. 10

It is important to note that this typology should not be perceived as ‘static categories, but as a conceptual (and political) space in which different [...] policies can be situated and developments can be traced over time’ (2005: 9). Few countries will be an
unambiguous exponent of one of the four ideal types, yet a country’s policies will generally be closer to one ideal type than to another (2005: 11). To determine the position of a country in the field of conceptions of citizenship, Koopmans et al. have operationalised the two dimensions of their typology into a set of empirical policy indicators. By measuring several indicators, differences between policy domains can be taken into account. For the ethnic-civic dimension they not only looked at the requirements for citizenship such as the minimum residence requirements, facilitated nationality access for the second generation and the allowance of dual nationality, but also at citizenship rights for foreign nationals and anti-discrimination legislation. Measures of the monism-pluralism dimension include: cultural requirements for naturalisation and permanent residence, allowance of religious practices inside and outside public institutions, political representation rights and affirmative action programmes (see Appendix A for a list of indicators of the 2008 edition). The policies on the monism-pluralism dimensions are not only influenced by ‘philosophies of integration’ (Favell, 2001), but also by pre-existing institutional settings such as State-Church relations and the degree of room for pluralism and civic organisations. Often integration policies are an extension of these regulations (see e.g. Soysal 1994; Favell 2001; Entzinger 2005; Maussen 2009).

All policies of the list of indicators received scores so that a ranking of the degree of monism-pluralism or ethnic-civic could be determined. For each country the score across each dimension was calculated for several points in time (the scoring system is explained in more detail in chapter two). This way the position of a country can be visualised and policy changes can be traced over time. The position of countries is not determined in an either-or way, but on a continuum. A country is not either multicultural or universalist, but more or less multicultural or assimilationist than another.

Koopmans et al. (2005) have calculated the position in the field of conceptions of citizenship of five European countries (Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom) and for three points in time (1980, 1990 and 2002). The results show that despite a general trend towards more civic and pluralistic policies, persistent and significant differences between countries remain (2005: 73). None of the countries fitted a segregationist conception of citizenship for any of the points in time. The policies of the three countries in this study each approximate a different conception of citizenship; the Netherlands with a combination of civic and pluralistic policies most approaches a multicultural model; France with a combination of civic and monistic policies most resembles universalism and Germany with an ethnic and monistic mix best approaches assimilationism. The label universalism for the French conception of citizenship does not imply the absence of pressures for assimilation. In universalist regimes, overt expressions of ethnic, linguistic or religious identity are seen as conflicting with participation in public institutions, as demonstrated in an exemplary fashion by the French ban on the wearing of “ostentatious religious symbols” in public schools. Contrary to assimilationist regimes, however, the public culture is not defined in particularistic terms (as in the frequent
Comparing integration

references in German debates to the country’s “Judeo-Christian” identity) but is – at least in theory – culturally neutral, i.e. universal.

The last point of measurement in the Koopmans et al. study is 2002. It is possible that since then, for instance as a response to 9/11 or to other changes in discourse on integration, policies have changed or converged. Koopmans and his collaborators recently extended their list of indicators and updated it to 2008. They found some changes from 2002 to 2008, but still Germany, the Netherlands and France study best fit an assimilationist, multiculturalist and universalist conception of citizenship (see chapter 2 for a description of policy developments).

Other studies based on policy indicators find similar differences between the Netherlands, France and Germany. Based on eight policy indicators for the period from 1980 to 2000 Banting et al. conclude that the Netherlands accommodates ethnic groups to a higher degree than France and Germany (Banting et al. 2006). The 140 indicators of policies regarding access to nationality, family reunion, long-term residence, labour market access, anti-discrimination, and political participation in 27 European countries and Canada for 2004 and 2006 of the MIPEX index confirm that the Netherlands still grants immigrants easier access to rights than Germany and France.3 Of all countries under investigation in 2006 the Netherlands ranks 4th, France 11th, and Germany 14th. Though the MIPEX indicators do not systematically distinguish between individual citizenship rights and accommodation of cultural difference, they also show that compared to France and the Netherlands, Germany scores particularly low on access to nationality and anti-discrimination. Of the three countries in this study, France scores lowest and the Netherlands highest on the indicator cluster that most clearly taps group rights, namely political participation, which includes special consultative bodies for immigrants and subsidies for their organizations.

Path-dependency development of integration policies

The policy differences between countries seem to be fairly stable. Several other studies also show a continuing relevance of the nation state and national differences for citizenship regulations (e.g. Bauböck et al. 2006). Howard has investigated the development of citizenship regulations in the 15 old member states of the EU and found ‘surprisingly resilient national differences’ (2005: 697). Why are these national differences so enduring despite some signs of cross-national convergence of integration policies (e.g. Joppke 2007a; Weil 2001)? This is in part due to the path-dependent nature of policy development (see e.g. Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000; van Waarden 1995). The creation of new policies generally follows the lines of previous policies. Favell argues that this ‘is not simply a question of habit or irrational reproduction of inherited conventions. It is rather a symptom of the contemporary political forces that are invested in the current status quo and which

need continually to reaffirm the current framework’ (2001: 27). He observes that ‘policy adaption is difficult because bringing into question the overall framework risks a renewed crisis’ (2001: 29). Overall, this means that ‘the balance of political forces is strongly in favour of the existing path and the costs of even the most rational reform might be too much in terms of the short-term crisis it might produce’ (2001: 30). These high costs limit the possibilities for radical change and result in a path-dependent development of policies in which paradigm shifts can occur but are not common.

The signalled changes in conceptions of citizenship particularly in the Netherlands (see e.g. Duyvendak 2004; Duyvendak and Scholten 2009) are often not so much changes in policies as they are changes in the political discourse (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). Discourse and policies stand in a dialectic relation (Maussen 2009: 26). Like policies, discourse is path-dependent because public support is most easily built on past ideas and language (Favell 2001) and because it is ‘generated and sustained by institutional approaches’ (Maussen 2009: 27). Policies are legitimised and understood through discourse (Favell 2001; Maussen 2009). Nevertheless, discourse and policies can diverge. At times of a paradigm shift (see Favell 2001) change in discourse is likely to go ahead of change in policies.

As Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) have shown it is hard to change discourse, but it is even harder to change policies, especially at the local level where many of the national policies are actually executed. They have done a case study of the Dutch city of Rotterdam, the city of which the discourse and political constellation was most affected by the backlash against multiculturalism that is often referred to as the Fortuyn-revolt. Nevertheless they found that local policies have proved ‘remarkably resilient’ (2008:336) and that ‘the Dutch exceptionalism stems not only from the radical way in which the Netherlands has turned from multiculturalism to assimilationalism but also from the limited extent to which the turn in official policy discourse seems to have taken effect in concrete policy practices’ (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008: 339). An often quoted example is mother tongue teaching in the Netherlands. Initially meant to ease return to the country of origin, it was subsequently framed as a stimulus to integration and even though the multicultural philosophy began to wane in the mid 1990s it took until 2006 for the courses to be abolished. This was because several groups had a vested interest in the continuation of these classes.

Koopmans et al. did not take into account discourse when determining the positions of countries in the field of conceptions of citizenship. It is possible that the countries in this study are experiencing a paradigm shift in discourse that will be followed

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4 Pim Fortuyn was a politician who skyrocketed in the polls in the 2002 municipal and parliamentary elections in the Netherlands on a populist anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim platform. On May 6th 2002, a week prior to the parliamentary elections, he was assassinated by an animal-rights activist. His party nevertheless received almost 20 per cent of the votes. In the municipal elections in Rotterdam the party *Leefbaar Rotterdam* that was led by Fortuyn received 35 per cent of the votes. In response to Fortuyn’s success many other parties now also plea for less accommodation of diversity and a stronger push toward host culture adoption of immigrants.
by a shift in policies. There are no systematic studies that compare the developments in discourse in the Netherlands, Germany and France. The few qualitative studies that examine part of the discourse on immigrant integration show that discourse does reflect the same conceptions of citizenship as the policies. Lettinga and Saharso show that for debates on the headscarf there are consistent differences between France and the Netherlands that reflect the same conceptions of citizenship as the policies (2009). Joppke has shown how headscarf debates in France and Germany also make use of nation-specific discourse (2007b). The lack of systematic data makes it hard to take discourse into account. I therefore, conceptualise the cross-national differences between the three countries as the conceptions of citizenship that are reflected in policies, not in discourse. In the concluding chapter I will however come back to this issue and will discuss to what extent a recent change in discourse can help explain the cross-national differences in socio-cultural integration. In the next chapter I will elaborate further on the policy developments in the Netherlands, Germany and France and show how their policies fit the multicultural, assimilationist and universalist conceptions of citizenship.

1.3 Host culture adoption and ethnic retention
Whereas in U.S.A. literature and debates the process of immigrants’ adjustment to life in host societies is generally discussed under the heading of ‘assimilation’, in European debates the term ‘integration’ is more common (Ellis and Almgren 2009). Both terms have not only been used to describe the general process, but also a specific form of immigrant adjustment. In Europe the term ‘integration’ is preferred because, more than in the U.S., the term ‘assimilation’ has strong normative connotations of a demand on immigrants to become completely similar to the host population and being forced to give up their ethnic culture (Brubaker 2001; Ellis and Almgren 2009). Since this dissertation focuses on European countries, I use the term ‘integration’ to describe the process of immigrant adjustment. Integration is generally divided in three main domains; socio-economic integration comprising the labour market, education and the housing market; political integration, including voting and standing for office but also participating in demonstrations and signing petitions; and socio-cultural integration in which identity, social contacts, attitudes, and cultural practices are key concepts. This dissertation focuses on socio-cultural integration.

There are two common views on socio-cultural integration. A linear one in which immigrants are expected to gradually shift to the use of the host country language and develop a host country identity, values and social circle at the expense of the ethnic language, identity, customs and acquaintances. This zero-sum view of socio-cultural integration has been criticised by several scholars who argue that integration does not always take place at the expense of the connections with the origin culture. A second approach to socio-cultural integration meets this critique and treats the relation with the
host country and origin or ethnic culture as two separate dimensions. One of the main proponents of this approach is J.W. Berry. In his model of acculturation Berry distinguishes two dimensions; adoption of host country culture and identity, and retention of the ethnic culture and identity (1997; 2001). I will refer to these dimensions as ‘adoption’ and ‘retention’ respectively. Berry assumes that the two dimensions are independent; retention can go hand in hand with adoption. The combination of these two dimensions leads to four acculturation strategies: marginalization, when the immigrant distances him/herself from both cultures, segregation, when the ethnic culture is maintained without adoption of the national culture, assimilation in which the national culture is adopted at the expense of the ethnic culture, and integration, in which both cultures are combined (see figure 1.2). To avoid confusion with integration as overarching concept, I will refer to this last strategy as biculturalism.

![Figure 1.2 Berry’s model of acculturation](image)

Throughout this dissertation four main factors are measured to determine adoption and retention: identification, language proficiency and use, religiousness and social contacts. These are all common indicators of socio-cultural integration (see e.g., Berry et al. 2006; Dagevos 2001; Gans 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). When possible these measures have been operationalised in a two-dimensional way. Retention is measured as identification with Turks, Turkish language proficiency, identification with Muslims and observance of Islamic religious practice. Though religion is a contested measure of integration, I have nevertheless chosen to include it. Religion, and particularly Islam, has taken centre stage in recent integration debates in Europe. Loyalty to Islam is frequently seen as limiting host country identification and therewith as a threat to social cohesion. It is therefore important to investigate which role religion plays and how it is connected to other aspects of socio-cultural integration. The Islamic religion is part of Turkish culture but not of the host country cultures. Of course there are natives in all three countries who have converted to Islam, and with the increasing number of Muslim migrants and their longer stay, it is not unlikely that Islam will become a part of host country culture. As
mean that I assume that people who are (observant) Muslims are not adopting the host country culture. Precisely because integration is measured independently on two dimensions we may find that people are both religious Muslims and have largely adopted the host culture. The measures of adoption are identification with the host society, host country language proficiency, host country language use and social contacts with host country members. The exact operationalisations of these measures are explained in the empirical chapters.

1.4 Theoretical model

Immigrants’ possibilities for adoption and retention are shaped by the host countries (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Berry 2001; Gans 1997; Bourhis et al. 1997; Ellis and Almgren 2009). I propose two types of mechanisms through which policies shape adoption and retention. Firstly, policies have a direct influence by affecting the material and emotional costs and benefits of adoption and retention. Secondly, policies have an indirect influence through their influence on members of the host society (Bourhis et al. 1997). Figure 1.3 presents the relationships between the two dimensions of the conceptions of citizenship (individual equality and accommodation of diversity) and adoption and retention. I will first discuss the possible effects of policies that accommodate diversity, then the effects of policies that grant individual equality. It is important to realise that integration is a process that evolves over time. The degree of adoption and retention of immigrants at a certain point in time is therefore not only affected by the policies at that moment but by all policies that have been in effect since the moment of arrival or, in the case of the second generation, the moment of birth.

Policies that accommodate cultural and religious diversity increase the material benefits of retention. Part of these material benefits lie in the subsidies for ethnic organizations that these types of policies provide and the possibilities to set up ethnic media, mother tongue teaching programmes, and schools of the own religious denomination. These ethnic institutions can in turn further stimulate retention by providing a forum for ethnic cultural and religious life. It is also in the interest of these organisations to stimulate a certain degree of retention because this can enlarge their funding base and underline their claims to representativeness. Policies that accommodate diversity can additionally stimulate retention by providing groups that claim minority status a channel for political demands in the form of special consultative bodies. Affirmative action can also raise the benefits of retention, because claiming belonging to a certain group can give preferential access to employment or education.

In countries with a low degree of accommodation of diversity ethnic retention is often seen as a counter-indication of host culture adoption. When this is the case, ethnic retention entails costs because it limits the access to rights - in particular those tied to

of yet this is however not the case. Also there are Christian minorities in Turkey, but these do not live in the regions that are included in this study (see below).
citizenship - that is contingent on host culture adoption. Policies that accommodate diversity take away these costs of ethnic retention. These policies can moreover lower the costs of retention by allowing expressions of particularistic identities in the public sphere; for instance if women who wear a headscarf can still attend public school or get a job as a teacher or in the civil service. By decreasing costs and increasing benefits, policies that accommodate diversity stimulate retention (hypothesis A).

By not requiring host culture adoption for access to the rights that come with naturalisation or permanent residence permits, policies of accommodation of diversity lower the benefits of adoption. This lack of material incentives can have a negative impact on levels of host culture adoption (hypothesis B).

Social-psychologists have on the other hand pointed out that accommodation of diversity can have a positive effect on adoption because it lowers the “acculturative stress” (Berry et al. 1987) of balancing ethnic and host-culture orientations. The emotional well-being and life satisfaction of immigrants can be negatively affected if they perceive a strong conflict between the demands of their (parents’) ethnic culture and the demands that the host society makes on them (see e.g., Berry 1997; Verkuyten and Nekuee 1999). Berry (1994: 214) suggests that the extent to which such tensions are felt depends on the integration policies pursued by the host country: ‘One might reasonably expect the stress of persons experiencing acculturation in plural societies to be lower than those in monistic societies that pursue assimilation. [...] If a person regularly receives the message that one’s culture, language, and identity are unacceptable, the impact on one’s sense of security and self-esteem will clearly be negative. If one is told that the price of admission to full participation in the larger society is to no longer be what one has grown up to be, the psychological conflict is surely heightened.’ The accommodation of diversity can thus lower the emotional costs of adoption. This argument is related to that of political

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Comparing integration

philosophers who argue that accommodation of diversity can stimulate participation in the institutions of host society and create a sense of belonging (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002). In her study on political integration in Canada and the United States, Bloemraad (2006) also contends that immigrants in Canada can more easily identify with their host country than those in the United States because of the acceptance of ethnic cultures. This leads to the assumption that the accommodation of diversity has a positive effect on adoption (hypothesis C).

Borrowing from social identity theory, several social-psychologists have argued that the perceived permeability of group boundaries can affect adoption (Verkuyten 2006; Ward and Leong 2006; Padilla and Perez 2003; see also Bourhis et al. 1997). Low permeability increases the emotional costs of adoption because adoption is not likely to lead to acceptance by members of the host society which in turn can negatively affect self-esteem. If group boundaries are seen as permeable, immigrants are more likely to ‘cross-over’ to the higher status group, i.e. the host society. The more policies treat immigrants as equal to host society members, by providing easy access to citizenship, granting citizenship rights to non-citizens and providing protection against discrimination, the more boundaries appear permeable. As Berry writes, the possibilities for immigrants to adopt the host country culture ‘may be constrained by the orientations of the receiving society’ (2001: 618). Immigrants can only make connections with host country ethnics if the latter agree to this (see e.g. Gans 1997). Bourhis et al. (1997) argue that policies influence the attitudes of host society members towards immigrants. If this is true, countries with policies that treat immigrant more equal will also have host societies that are more open to interaction with immigrants. This can in turn stimulate adoption. The degree of individual equality can therefore positively impact adoption both through perceived permeability and through the attitudes of host society members (hypothesis D).

Exclusion from individual equality and especially discrimination do not only limit the possibilities for adoption, it might also increase retention through a process of “reactive ethnicity”. Verkuyten has repeatedly demonstrated that higher levels of perceived discrimination lead to higher levels of identification with the own ethnic group and lower levels of identification with the host society (Verkuyten and Brug 2002; Verkuyten 2006; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Portes and Rumbaut argue that reactive ethnicity can also be a response to political and societal debates (2001). For political mobilisation Koopmans et al. have shown the effect of conceptions of citizenship on the self-identification and demands of immigrant organizations (Koopmans et al. 2005). Of the three countries in this study, immigrants in Germany, the country that provides least material and symbolic resources for adoption, were also least likely to use identities that refereed to the host country and most likely to make claims directed at Turkey instead of at Germany. This leads to the prediction that a low degree of individual equality leads to more retention (hypothesis E).
In the empirical chapters the theoretical model will be used to formulate hypotheses on the relative levels of adoption and retention in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Each chapter will test several of the above hypothesised relationships.

1.5 Research design: a quasi-experiment

The selection of the target countries in this research is based on a most similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). France, Germany and the Netherlands are all liberal democracies, welfare states and became de facto countries of immigration soon after the Second World War. As I will illustrate in chapter two, they however differ on my main variable of interest; their integration policies exhibit different conceptions of citizenship. To get a clear view of the effect of the variable of interest it is important to minimize the effects of confounding variables. Two of the most significant factors complicating international comparative research on immigrant integration are the different definitions of the population concerned (foreign citizens, immigrants, or racial or ethnic minorities) and the differences in origin countries (Favell 2003). Citizenship status, migration generation and origin country are all known to have an effect on levels of integration (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; van Tubergen 2004). It is therefore essential to design the research in such a way that these factors can be controlled for.

To resolve the problems of cross-national differences in the definition of the immigrant population, new data has been gathered using the same definition in each of the three countries. Our target population includes both foreign and naturalised citizens and both foreign-born and host country born children of immigrants. Collecting new data has the additional advantage over using existing data that the exact same questions could be used in each country, which is an important advantage over studies comparing data from different, independently gathered, national surveys.

There are two ways of resolving the problem of the differences in the composition of the immigrant population between countries. The most common solution is to add control variables for origin country to the regression analyses (see e.g. Kogan 2004). However this strategy does not solve all problems. Some groups are very common in some countries and rare in others. Only the Netherlands has a significant Surinamese population, and Algerians, who form the most important group in France, rarely migrated to other countries. Representative surveys of the immigrant population consequently offer very limited possibilities to compare specific groups across countries. I have therefore chosen to limit the target group to one country of origin, namely Turkey. Turks are the largest immigrant group in Europe (Lederer 1997). Over 70 per cent of Turkish migrants and their descendants in Europe live in the Netherlands, France and Germany. An additional reason for choosing Turkish migrants is that this is a predominantly Muslim group, which allows the investigation of the role of the Islamic religion in socio-cultural integration. Germany has been the main destination for Turkish migration in Europe. Currently there are almost 2.5 million people of Turkish origin in Germany. The Netherlands and France have a
similar sized Turkish origin population of over 350,000 (see Table 1.1). The Turkish migration to Germany, France and the Netherlands took place under similar circumstances. No colonial links exist, and migration started with the guest-worker recruitment programmes in the 1960s. The migration is therefore old enough to allow for inclusion of an adult second generation in the study.

Limiting the target group to one country of origin still leaves several possibilities for confounding variables. Though in all three countries migration started with guest-worker recruitment in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the migration patterns started to diverge after the end of recruitment in 1973-1974. The Netherlands and France had a more generous family reunification policy than Germany, which led to a stronger post-recruitment migration surge (Muus 2003; Dagevos et al. 2006; Böcker and Groenendijk 2006). The coup d’etat of 1980 caused a wave of (mostly left-wing) Turkish refugees to Europe. These and later Kurdish refugees mainly went to Germany (Akgündüz 1993). Table 1.1 shows that the post-recruitment growth in the Turkish origin population has been much stronger in France and the Netherlands than in Germany. In the former two countries the population increased roughly six-fold, in Germany the population barely doubled in size. It is possible that the family migrants and refugees were differently selected than the guest-workers migrants. The target group of this study is therefore further limited to migrants who came at the time of guest-worker recruitment (1975 is used as the cut-off point) and their children and grandchildren. Migrants who arrived after 1975 either as spouse, asylum seeker or student are excluded from the target population.

Table 1.1: Number Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany in 1975 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1975¹</th>
<th>1st gen 2005</th>
<th>1st + 2nd generation 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>62,600</td>
<td>195,678</td>
<td>368,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50,860²</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>325,000-375,000³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,077,100</td>
<td>1,471,800</td>
<td>2,397,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Turkish nationality (including second generation).
² Includes second generation younger than 18. Excludes naturalised Turkish immigrants, the majority of which were not guest-workers but Armenian refugees from the early twentieth century (Tribalat 1993)
³ There are no exact data available on the size of the second generation. This estimate is based on number of French-born children in Turkish households in 1999

Turkey is a country with large regional differences in prosperity, religious life, ethnic composition, degree of urbanization and levels of education. The regional origins of Turkish migrants vary between destination countries. For instance, most Turks in Belgium are from Afyon-Emirdağ and in Sweden from Konya. In Germany migrants from the
European and south-western part of Turkey are believed to be overrepresented. Past research has mostly neglected the potential role of origin regions, but as some authors have pointed out these different origins can impact integration (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003c; Dagevos et al. 2006; Den Exter 1993). The target group is therefore lastly limited to two rural regions in Central Turkey: South-Central and East-Central Anatolia. South-Central Anatolia is a predominantly ethnic Turkish and religiously Sunnite region. The provinces of Karaman and Konya, which form the core of the region, are renowned for their religious conservatism. Most residents of South-Central Anatolia are ethnically Turkish, though there is a minority of (assimilated) Kurds in Konya. East-Central Anatolia has more ethnic diversity with minorities of Kurds and Zaza and harbours a significant percentage of Alevi. Alevis is a humanistic current within Islam. According to rough estimates Alevi constitute 25 per cent of the Turkish population. Many Turkish Sunnites think Alevi are not ‘real’ Muslims because they do not visit the mosque and do not practice Ramadan. Chapter three pays attention to the effect that religious denomination and regional origin have on integration patterns.

The target population is thus limited to Turkish migrants from South-Central and East-Central Anatolia, who migrated to their respective host countries before 1975 as well as their adult children and grandchildren who either migrated as minors to join their parents or were born in the host country. Because the target group is so narrowly defined the design can be seen as a quasi-experiment. A similar group of Turks migrated to three different host countries where they and their children received conceptions of citizenship as “treatment” (Cf. Bloemraad 2006).

The quasi-experimental nature of this study is an important innovation. Existing cross-national surveys rarely contain information on the region of origin and often lack information on the timing and type of immigration (see also Crul and Vermeulen 2003). However, narrowing down the target group has not ruled out all confounding factors. An important remaining difference is the relative size of the Turkish population in the three countries. Table 1.2 presents the relative share of the Turkish population in the Netherlands, France and Germany. When only taking into account those born in Turkey, the relative size of the Turkish origin population is highest in Germany with 1.78 per cent, slightly lower in the Netherlands with 1.20 per cent, but much lower in France with only 0.36 per cent (see Table 1.2).

The relative size of the Turkish community might lead to cross-national differences in ethnic culture retention and host culture adoption. A high concentration of co-ethnics can create a more favourable opportunity structure for expressing the ethnic culture, as there are more people to speak the ethnic language with and more possibilities to set up an ethnic infrastructure with a variety of businesses, cultural centres, and religious institutions. Concentration can also impact retention through social control.

South-Central Anatolia consists of the provinces Afyon, Aksaray, Karaman, Kayseri, Konya, Nevşehir, and Niğde. East-Central Anatolia encompasses Adıyaman, Amasya, Elazığ, Malatya, Tokat, Tunceli and Sivas.
Comparing integration

Environments with a high concentration of co-ethnics facilitate punishment for non-observance of group norms and customs in the form of gossip and social exclusion. A study by Van Tubergen (2004) however, did not find a significant correlation between the relative size of an ethnic group and religious affiliation or attendance. Ethnic concentration can also impact host culture adoption. The higher the concentration of co-ethnics the smaller the chances of interaction with host country members. A high concentration of co-ethnics can also lower the incentives for host culture adoption since an ethnic enclave can provide migrants with many of their needs (van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005). Van Tubergen and Kalmijn found a negative effect of relative group size on host country language proficiency (2005) and Gijsberts and Dagevos found a negative impact of segregation on social contacts with host country members (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2004). Since the aim of this study is to investigate the effects of integration policies, all other factors known to influence adoption and retention must, if possible, be statistically controlled for. All statistical analyses in this dissertation are therefore controlled for the relative size of the Turkish population in the place of residence of the respondent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st gen 2004-2006</th>
<th>1st gen as % of total population</th>
<th>1st gen as % of total immigrant population</th>
<th>1st + 2nd gen</th>
<th>2nd gen as % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>195,678</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>12.18</td>
<td>368,600</td>
<td>45.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,471,800</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>2,397,400</td>
<td>38.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.2: Share of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany in 2004-2006

Mixed methods

Data was collected with mixed methods. To get an overview of cross-national differences and to be able to control for background variables, a nation-wide telephone survey was held in all three countries. Though telephone surveys have a lower response rate than face-to-face surveys, the advantage is that they are more cost and time efficient especially with a nation-wide sample of a highly selective population as is the case in this study. The data from the survey were later supplemented with in-depth interviews with a selected number of survey respondents.

Survey

To obtain a representative sample of the Turkish immigrant population in each country, it would have been preferable to use a sampling frame based on population registries such as the Dutch municipal database (GBA) that include information on the country of origin (and that of the parents) of all inhabitants. Since France and Germany do not have such a database, this sampling technique could not be used. Because of the cross-national
comparative nature of this study, it is more important to choose a sampling technique that can be used in all countries, than to make the optimal choice for each individual country. Using different sampling techniques across countries can potentially introduce a source of extraneous variance. After exploring several possibilities, a combination of sampling techniques was chosen, each with their own potential bias; phone book sampling based on surnames, holidaymaker sampling in the regions of origin and snowballing. All three techniques were used in all three countries. Details on the sampling procedures are given in appendix C. All the regressions in the empirical chapters include control variables for the sub-sample that a respondent belonged to.

The survey was conducted between November 2005 and June 2006. All surveys were administered by bilingual interviewers (Turkish and the host country language) with help of the online survey programme Examine7. Respondents could choose whether to answer the survey questions in Turkish or in the language of their host country. At the start of the questionnaire filter questions were used to determine whether a person was a member of the target group. Because of the strict inclusion criterions several thousand phone-calls were necessary to complete a sufficient number of interviews. The response rates are given in appendix D. Exactly one thousand respondents participated in the survey; 273 in the Netherlands, 295 in Germany and 432 in France.

Appendix E presents the sample descriptives per country. It shows that the demographic characteristics of the samples are comparable across countries. Even though this study does not aim to be representative of the Turkish population in each of the countries, a modest comparison between the sample and data from population surveys is included in appendix E. The regional spread of the sample of this study shows some divergences from population statistics as does the level of education. These divergences are however small, which suggests that our choice of sampling techniques has not led to large sampling biases.

In-depth interviews
To gain more insight into the factors influencing adoption and retention over the life course I conducted in-depth interviews. At the end of the telephone survey people were asked whether they were willing to participate in an in-depth interview at a later date. By recruiting the respondents for the in-depth interviews through the telephone survey it was possible to achieve a more representative sample than through snowball techniques that are commonly used to recruit in-depth interview respondents. For each generation, appendix F compares the characteristics of the in-depth interview respondents to the mean characteristics of the entire sample in the same country. The comparisons show that there are only minor differences between the two.

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In each country I chose two regions in which to conduct the interviews. For France these were Rhône-Alpes (major cities in this region are Lyon, Valence, and Grenoble) and Alsace (major cities in this region Strasbourg, Colmar, Mulhouse); for Germany North Rhine–Westphalia (major cities in this Land are Cologne, Bonn, Duisburg and Dortmund) and Baden-Württemberg (major cities in this Land are Stuttgart, Mannheim, Heidelberg and Ulm); and for the Netherlands the Randstad (spanning the region between Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht) and the eastern provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel. The practical advantage of choosing specific regions was that it limited travel time. It also allowed an investigation of possible regional differences within the countries of study, for which I however found little evidence. In all countries regions were chosen with a high share of Turkish migrants. It is possible that the integration dynamics in regions with low numbers of Turkish migrants are different, but it was not efficient to do in-depth interviews in those regions. However as the tables in appendix F show, the relative size of the Turkish population in the places of residence of the interview respondents was barely larger than in the sample as a whole. This is because even within regions with a high share of Turkish migrants, several respondents lived in places with few other Turks.

I conducted all interviews in 2007. The interviews were semi-structured. If people had indicated in the survey that they have problems with the host country language they were contacted by a Turkish speaking interpreter who also attended the interviews. This was almost always necessary in the case of the first generation. The majority of interviews took place in the homes of the respondents but in some cases also in their stores or in a bar or café. When the respondent gave permission, the interview was taped and fully transcribed. A total of 86 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted; 29 in Germany, 28 in France and 29 in the Netherlands. More details on the procedure are presented in appendix F.

1.6 Overview of the dissertation

The next chapter gives an overview of the policies and policy developments in France, Germany and the Netherlands from the 1970s until now. Chapter three looks at the cross-national differences of the four aspects of adoption and retention: identification, language proficiency, religiousness and social contacts. Based on the policy descriptions of chapter two and the theoretical model presented in this chapter, I formulate hypotheses on the differences in levels of adoption and retention between the countries that are subsequently tested with the data from the telephone survey. In chapter four data from both the survey and the in-depth interviews are used to explore the relation between policies and identification. I specifically look at the role of perceived permeability on host country identification. The next chapter (Chapter 5) provides a quantitative exploration of the influence of naturalisation policies on host culture adoption. I compare the associations between citizenship status and host culture adoption within and between countries. The analyses in this chapter are solely based on the foreign-born respondents in the survey.
dataset, since the host country born respondents in France and the Netherlands almost all possess host country citizenship. Chapter 6 continues the focus on naturalisation policies. I use the data from the in-depth interviews to investigate what instrumental and emotional motives immigrants give for their decisions to naturalise or stay foreigners. I hypothesise that the kind of motives used are dependent on the naturalisation requirements and the attitude towards citizenship in the respective host countries. I pay special attention to the role of emotional (identity) motives and the role of the possibility of dual nationality in naturalisation decisions. The final chapter, Chapter 7, provides an overview of all the findings of the study. I draw some conclusions on the effects of integration policies on the socio-cultural integration of immigrants and also look at several alternative explanations for the findings. I will end with a discussion of the implications and limitations and suggestions for future research.